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Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of
individuals. Recent work stimulated by the discovery of “zero-determinant” strategies has
rapidly expanded our ability to analyze such interactions. This body of work has primarily
focused on games in which players face a simple binary choice, to “cooperate” or “defect”.
Real individuals, however, often exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social
interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater
diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of social dynamics in finite popula-
tions. We show that, in public goods games, some two-choice strategies can nonetheless
resist invasion by all possible multi-choice invaders, even while engaging in relatively little
punishment. We also show that access to greater behavioral choice results in more “rugged
” fitness landscapes, with populations able to stabilize cooperation at multiple levels of
investment, such that choice facilitates cooperation when returns on investments are low,
but hinders cooperation when returns on investments are high. Finally, we analyze iterated
rock-paper-scissors games, whose non-transitive payoff structure means unilateral control is
difficult and zero-determinant strategies do not exist in general. Despite this, we find that a
large portion of multi-choice strategies can invade and resist invasion by strategies that lack
behavioral diversity – so that even well-mixed populations will tend to evolve behavioral
diversity.
Diversity in social behaviors, not only in humans but across all domains of life, presents a daunting
challenge to researchers who work to explain and predict individual social interactions or their evolution
in populations. Iterated games provide a framework to approach this task, but determining the outcome
of such games under even moderately complex, realistic assumptions – such as memory of past interac-
tions [1–7], signaling of intentions, indirect reciprocity or identity [8–15], or a heterogeneous network of
interactions [16–24] – is exceedingly difficult.
The discovery of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [2] has stimulated rapid advances in our ability to
analyse iterated games [1,3,26–29,31–33], leading to new understanding of how one individual can influence
the longterm outcome of a pairwise social interaction, the evolutionary potential for cooperation, the
prospects for generosity and extortion among groups, and the role of memory in social dynamics [34–38].
These advances all rest on a key mathematical insight: the outcome of iterated games can be easily
understood when players’ strategies, even those of startling complexity [3,28,33], are viewed in the right
coordinate system. This coordinate system was suggested by the discovery of ZD strategies and developed
fully by Akin [26] and others [1,3,28,31,32]. ZD strategies have also been generalized to two-player games
with arbitrary actions spaces [31]. Here, we study evolutionary dynamics in the full space of memory-1
strategies in a population of players with access to multiple behavioral choices, including games for which
no ZD strategies exist at all.
Many game-theoretic studies of social behavior, although by no means all [31,39,40], constrain players
to a binary behavioral choice such as “cooperate” or “defect” [41, 42]. Other studies, particularly those
looking at social evolution, constrain players to a single type of behavioral strategy, but allow for a con-
tinuum of behavioral choices – e.g. the option to contribute an arbitrary amount of effort to an obligately
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cooperative interaction [39, 40]. In general, and especially in the case of human interactions, individuals
have access to both a wide variety of behavioral choices, and to a complex decision making process among
these choices. Here we bridge this gap and study how the diversity of behavioral choices impacts the
evolution of decision making in a replicating population, focusing on the prospects for cooperation and
for the maintenance of behavioral diversity.
We develop a framework for analyzing iterated games in which players have an arbitrary number
of behavioral choices and an arbitrary memory-1 strategy for choosing among them. We apply this
framework to study the effect of a large behavioral repertoire on the evolution of cooperation in public
goods games. We show that increasing the number of investment levels available to a player can either
facilitate or hinder the evolution of cooperation in a population, depending on the ratio of individual costs
to public benefits in the game. We apply the same framework to study games with non-transitive payoff
structures, such as rock-paper-scissors, and we show that, while ZD strategies in general do not exist for
such games, nonetheless memory-1 strategies exist that ensure the maintenance of behavioral diversity,
in which players make use of all the choices available to them.
Methods and Results
Players in an iterated game repeatedly choose from a fixed set of possible actions. Depending on the choice
she makes, and the choices her opponents make, a player receives a certain payoff each round. The process
by which a player determines her choice each round is called her strategy. A strategy may in general take
into account a wide variety of information about the environment, memory of prior interactions between
players, an opponent’s identity, his social signals etc [1–6,10,12–15,19–24]. Here we restrict our analysis to
two-player, simultaneous infinitely iterated games in which a player chooses from among d possible actions
using a memory-1 strategy, which takes account only the immediately preceding interaction between her
and her opponent. Although memory-1 strategies may seem restrictive, in fact a strategy that is a Nash
equilibrium or evolutionary robust against all memory-1 strategies is also robust against all longer memory
strategies as well (see SI and [1–3,33]).
A memory-1 strategy is specified by choosing d2 probabilities for each possible action i, denoted pijk,
which specify the chance the player executes that action in a round of play, given that she made choice j
and her opponent made choice k in the preceding round. Each probability can be chosen independently,
save for the constraint that the sum across actions
∑d
i=1 p
i
jk = 1 must hold. We study the evolution
of social behavior by analyzing the composition of such strategies in a replicating population over time.
In an evolving population the reproductive success of a player depends on the total payoff she receives
in pairwise interactions with other members of the population [43]. We study how strategy evolution is
affected by the number and by the types of behavioral choices available to individuals.
We study two qualitatively different behavioral choices that players can make: different sizes of
contributions and different types of contributions to social interactions (Figure 1). If players can vary
the size of the contribution they make to a social interaction, this means that they alter the degree of
their participation but not the qualitative nature of the interaction. For example, in a public goods
game, a player may choose to contribute an amount C to the public good, or 2C, or 3C etc. In contrast,
when players can vary the type of contribution they make, this can change the qualitative nature of
the social interaction. For example, in a game of rock-paper-scissors the different behavioral choices
result in qualitatively different social interactions – rock beats scissors, but scissors beats paper, etc.
Such qualitative differences can lead to non-transitive payoffs and correspondingly complex social and
evolutionary dynamics [44–50].
Here we study both kinds of behavioral choice, differences in size and type, and their effects on the
evolution of strategies in a population. We analyze well-mixed, finite populations of N players reproducing
according to a copying process, in which a player X copies her opponent Y ’s strategy with probability
1/(1 + exp [σ(Sx − Sy)]) where σ scales the strength of selection and Sx is the average payoff received by
player X from her social interactions with each of the N−1 other members of the population [41,43], which
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corresponds to the fitness associated with the strategy given the current composition of the population.
For a single invader Y in a population otherwise composed of strategy X, this means Sy = Syx and
Sx =
N−2
N−1Sxx +
1
N−1Sxy
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Figure 1: Two ways to expand the behavioral repertoire in iterated games. (Top) In a public goods game a player
contributes to a public pool at some cost to herself, and she receives a benefit based on the contributions of all
players in the game. In a simple two-choice game, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, players face a binary choice, to
cooperate and contribute cost C or to defect and contribute nothing. At the other extreme, in a continuous game,
players have an unlimited number of options and may contribute any amount. What happens to the evolution of
social behavior as the numbers of choices increases? Is it beneficial for a population to have access to more choices
in a public goods game? (Bottom) Players may also choose between qualitatively different types of contributions
to social interactions. For example, unicellular organisms may produce pathogens, social signals, public goods or
all three [44,55–57]. Qualitatively different behavioral options produce complex payoff structures, such as the non-
transitive rock-paper-scissors interactions [44–47]. What happens to the evolution of social behavior as the types of
contributions to social interactions expand? Is it better to maintain a diversity of behavioral options, or to restrict
to a single type of contribution?
The outcome of an infinitely iterated d-choice game:
To analyse social evolution in multi-choice iterated games we must first calculate the expected longterm
payoff Sxy of an arbitrary player X facing an arbitrary opponent Y . To do this, we will generalize an
approach used for two-choice two-player games, in which a player’s memory-1 strategy p is represented
in an alternate coordinate system [26] so that the outcome of the repeated game can be determined with
relative ease. For a d-choice two-player game, the probability that a focal player chooses action i, given
that she played action j and her opponent action k in the preceding round, is denoted pijk. For each action
1 ≤ i < d there are d2 independent probabilities, corresponding to each possible outcome of the preceding
round. In the alternate coordinate system we construct (see SI), the probabilities pijk are written as linear
combinations of the payoff Rjk the focal player received in the preceding round, times a coefficient χ
i; the
payoff Rkj her opponent received, times a coefficient φ
i; the number of times she played action i within
her memory (which is one or zero for a memory-1 strategy); a baseline rate of playing action i, denoted
κi; and d2− 3 additional terms that depend on the specific outcome of the preceding round, denoted λijk.
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This choice of coordinate system enforces the following relationship between the longterm average payoffs
received by the two players:
φiSyx − χiSxy − (φi − χi)κi +
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
λijkvjk = 0 (1)
where vjk denotes the equilibrium rate of action jk, and where we fix the values of three of the λ
i
jk to
ensure a system of d2 coordinates (see SI). Note there are d − 1 such equations, one for each behavioral
choice 1 ≤ i < d. A ZD strategy of the type studied in [31] can be recovered by setting all λijk = 0.
However the constraint that pijk ∈ [0, 1] implies that the ZD condition does not always produce a viable
strategy, as in the case of a rock-paper-scissors game discussed below.
Choosing how much to contribute to a public good:
We will use the relationship between two players scores (Eq. 1) to analyse the evolution and stability of
cooperative behaviors in multi-choice public goods games, played in a finite population. In the two-player
public goods game each player chooses an investment level, C, which produces a corresponding amount of
public benefit that is then shared equally between both players, regardless of their investment choices. In
general, if a player invests Cj and her opponent Ck the public benefit produced is determined by a function
B(Cj +Ck), so that her net payoff is B(Cj +Ck)/2−Cj while her opponent’s payoff is B(Cj +Ck)/2−Ck.
Two-choice public goods games have been studied extensively, producing a clear understanding of the
cooperative equilibria that exist in populations [1, 3, 26,27,34–36].
A wide variety of evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies exist for two-choice public goods games.
The character and evolvability of these strategies have been explored in detail [1,3,34,36,51–53]. But the
assumption of only two investment levels – of two behavioral choices – is unrealistic for many applications.
Even if a player adopts such a two-choice strategy, there is in general no reason for her opponent to do
the same. Thus we begin our analysis by asking whether a cooperative, two-choice, memory-1 strategy
resident in a population can resist invasion against players who can make arbitrary investment choices.
For simplicity, we will focus here on a linear relationship between costs and benefits of investment
in the public good, so that B = rC where values 1 < r < 2 produce a social dilemma in which mutual
cooperation is beneficial but each player has an incentive to defect. The more general case, with non-linear
functional relationships, is described in the Supporting Information.
For linear benefits, a two-choice strategy is completely defined by
p1i = 1− ((φ− χ)(r(C1 + Ci)/2− κ)− φCi + χC1 + λ1i)
p2i = − ((φ− χ)(r(C2 + Ci)/2− κ)− φCi + χC2 + λ2i)
where the index i corresponds to an opponent who invests Ci, which in general can take any non-
negative value. Here we choose the boundary conditions λ11 = λ22 = 0 and λ12 = λ21, and from Eq. 1 we
obtain the following relationship between two players’ longterm payoffs
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) = 0
When player Y is constrained to the same two choices as player X, then this relationship reduces precisely
to the relationship for two-player, two-choice games discussed in [1, 2, 26, 36]. However, we will consider
the more general case when player Y has access to different, and possibly more, investment choices than
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X. In general, a strategy X resident in a population of N players can resist selective invasion by a mutant
Y iff
Syx <
N − 2
N − 1Sxx +
1
N − 1Sxy
where Sxx is the longterm payoff of the resident strategy against itself. A cooperative two-choice strategy
by definition has Sxx = (r− 1)C2, i.e. it stabilizes cooperative behavior at equilibrium, with both players
choosing to invest the maximum public good they can contribute.
Using the relationships above we can derive the following conditions for a two-choice cooperative
strategy to be universally robust to invasion – that is, robust against all invaders Y , who can make an
arbitrary number of different investment choices, including values above C2 or below C1 (see SI):
Cds =
{
(p11, p12, . . . , p1d, p21, p22, . . . , p2d)
∣∣∣∣p11 = 1,
p1j < 1− N − 2
N
(1− p12 + p21)1− c
∗
1− c
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
,
p2j <
N − 2
N
(1− p12 + p21)
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
1− c∗
1− c +
1
N − 2
]
,
p1j < 1− p22
r − 1
1− c∗
1− c
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
p2j <
p22
r − 1
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
1− c∗
1− c +
1
N − 2
]}
,
(2)
where we have set c = C1/C2 and c
∗ = Cj/C2. All four of these inequalities are hardest to satisfy when
c∗ = 0, i.e. when an invader does not invest at all in the public good (although this is not necessarily the
case when benefits vary non-linearly with costs – see Supporting Information). Using this fact, alongside
the requirement that a strategy be viable (i.e. pij ∈ [0, 1], ∀i, j), we can derive the following necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a two-choice strategy that is universally robust:
C1
C2
<
r − 1
r
2 +
1
N−2
(3)
If (and only if) Eq. 3 is satisfied, then there exists a two-choice strategy that enforces cooperation at some
level when resident in a population, and that resists invasion by any invader, regardless of the invader’s
ability to choose different investment levels.
Eq. 3 offers insight into the degree of punishment that a resident cooperative strategy must be prepared
to wield, in order to remain robust against all invaders (Fig. 2). A resident strategy can punish a non-
cooperative invader by reducing her investment in the public good from C2 to C1. If C1 is only slightly
smaller than C2 then the resident strategy has a limited capacity to punish invaders. Wheres if C1 is
much less than C2 the resident strategy has a greater capacity for punishment. The critical question is
how much capacity for punishment, quantified by the ratio of C1 and C2, is required to ensure that the
resident cooperator can be robust against all invaders (who can make arbitrary investments, outside of
those available to the resident). The answer to this question is shown in Figure 2, which quantifies the
minimum reduction in public investment that a cooperative two-choice strategy must make in order to
be universally robust. As might be expected from Eq. 3, larger ratios of public benefit to individual
cost r and larger population sizes N mean that smaller reductions in public investment are sufficient for
universal robustness of the resident cooperator. And as Fig. 2 shows, for a wide range of parameters a
population can enjoy robust cooperation using a simple two-choice strategy with only moderate threat of
punishment, e.g. C1 no less than than one-half of C2.
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Figure 2: When are simple two-choice strategies robust against all multi-choice invaders in public goods games?
We considered the evolutionary robustness of two-choice strategies, in which players iteratively choose to invest
amount C1 or C2 > C1 to produce a public benefit B proportional to the total investment of both players, B = rC.
Cooperative strategies limited to two investment choices can be evolutionary robust against all invaders, who may
invest an arbitrary amount C 6= C1, C2, provided the strategy has sufficient opportunity to punish a defector –
that is, provided C1 is sufficiently smaller than C2. We determined (Eq. 4) the largest ratio of investment levels,
C2/C1, that permits universally robust cooperative two-choice strategies, as a function of the the population size,
N , and the public return on individual investment, r. Colors are gradated in 10% intervals, so that the light
blue region indicates a two-choice player can choose a strategy that maintains robust cooperation while engaging
in relatively little punishment, by reducing her investment to only 90% of its maximum. The bright red region
indicates that a two-choice player must have access to a high degree of punishment, C1 much less than C2, in order
to maintain cooperation. As described in Eq. 4, the figure can alternatively be interpreted as the proportion of pairs
of investment levels used by a d-choice player that produce a robust sub-optimal fitness peak, and thus represents
a lower bound on the “ruggedness” of the fitness landscape experienced by a population of d-choice players.
Evolutionary consequences of multiple investment choices:
We now turn our attention to the implications of these results for an evolving population of players who
can make d > 2 choices for investment in the public good. We assume a discrete series of d+1 investment
levels, from 0 to the maximum Cmax, so that subsequent levels of investment differ by Cmax/d. When
d is large, players have more options for investment, between the fixed minimum value zero and fixed
maximum value Cmax.
Because all two-choice strategies form a subset of d-choice strategies, an evolving population of d-choice
players has access to, at minimum, all evolutionary robust two-choice strategies. Thus, unlike in the two-
choice case, where there are only three qualitatively distinct types of evolutionary robust strategies [1], a
d-choice population may result in many different classes of evolutionary robust outcomes, most of which
are sub-optimal in the sense that they produce less public good than the global maximum, rCmax.
We can place a lower bound on how many such sub-optimal, but evolutionary robust, outcomes are
possible when players have d+ 1 choices. Any given pair of investment levels Ci and Cj , with i > j, can
be a robust two-choice strategy provided Ci and Cj satisfy Eq. 4. Thus all pairs of investment levels
j < r−1r
2
+ 1
N−2
i have viable robust two-choice strategies associated with them; and for a d + 1-choice game
the total number of such evolutionary robust but sub-optimal strategies, Pr, satisfies
Pr >
(
r − 1
r
2 +
1
N−2
)
d(d+ 1)
2
. (4)
6
Thus the number of sub-optimal evolutionary robust outcomes grows at least quadratically with the
number of investment levels available to individuals.
Fig. 2 can now be re-interpreted as showing the proportion of pairs of investment levels that can
produce a robust, sub-optimal two-choice strategy for a population of d+ 1-choice players. To put these
results in perspective, if players are allowed d = 100 investment choices, with return on investment
r = 3/2, then in a population size N = 1, 000 there are at least 3.6 × 103 robust strategies that fail
to maximize the total public good – resulting in an extremely “rugged” fitness landscape and a large
number of sub-optimal evolutionary outcomes. By contrast, with only d = 2 choices, there are at most
two sub-optimal evolutionary robust outcomes [1].
We have seen that increasing the number of available choices to players, between a fixed minimum and
maximum investment level, has the potential to produce sub-optimal but evolutionary robust outcomes.
To test how the number of available choices impacts evolutionary dynamics in a population, we ran
evolutionary simulations under weak mutation [36], with mutants drawn uniformly from all d-choice
memory-1 strategies. We compared the mean payoffs received by populations constrained to d = 2
choices, to the mean payoffs in populations with access to d = 11 choices (Figure 3). The results are
striking: when ratios of public benefit to individual cost are low, so that robust strategies are rare (Eqs. 2-
3), the population that has d = 11 investment choices evolves a higher mean payoff than the d = 2 choice
population – because a greater number of robust cooperative strategies provides an advantage. But when
ratios of public benefit to individual cost are higher, so that robust strategies are more common, the 11-
choice population evolves a lower mean payoff than the 2-choice population – because the huge number
of sub-optimal robust strategies causes the 11-choice population to “get stuck” and fail to maximize its
evolutionary potential. Thus, increasing the number of investment options, between a fixed minimum and
maximum, can either facilitate or hinder cooperative interactions in a population.
Non-transitive payoff structures:
So far we have focused on multiple options for investment and its impact on the evolution of cooperative
behaviors in public goods games. But the co-ordinate system we have introduced for studying multi-choice
iterated games, and the resulting relationship between two players’ scores (Eq. 1), applies generally, and so
it can be applied to study many other questions in evolutionary game theory. Among the most interesting
questions occur with only d = 3 choices, but with non-transitive payoffs, where the evolutionary dynamics
are complex and the impact of repeated interactions remains unclear [44–50].
Games with non-transitive payoff structures, such as rock-paper-scissors, describe social dynamics
without any strict hierarchy of behaviors. Individuals can invest in qualitatively different types of behavior,
which dominate in some social interactions but lose out in others. Such non-transitive interactions have
been observed in a range of biological systems, from communities of Escherichia coli species [44], to mating
competition among male side-blotched lizards Uta stansburiana [45]. Rock-paper-scissors interactions are
well known in ecology as having important consequences for the maintenance of biodiversity: in well
mixed populations playing the one-shot game, diversity is often lost, whereas in spatially distributed
populations multiple strategies can be stably maintained [46,47]. Here we analyse the equivalent problem
for the maintenance of diversity in evolving populations of players who engage in iterated non-transitive
interactions.
We will assess the potential for maintaining behavioral diversity in a population playing an iterated
rock-paper-scissors game – that is, we look for strategies that can resist invasion by players who employ a
single behavioral choice (1=rock, 2=paper or 3=scissors). We assume that, in any given interaction, a fixed
benefit B is at stake, and players invest a cost C1, C2 or C3 to execute the corresponding behavioral choice.
Under the rock-paper-scissors game we then have payoffs R13 = B − C1, R21 = B − C2, R32 = B − C3,
R31 = −C3, R12 = −C1 and R23 = −C2. When two players make the same choice we assume they receive
equal payoff: R11 = B/2− C1, R22 = B/2− C1 and R33 = B/2− C1.
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Figure 3: Does a larger behavioral repertoire make cooperation easier to evolve? We evolved a well-mixed popula-
tion of N = 100 haploid, asexual individuals reproducing according to the copying process [43] with an individual’s
fitness determined by playing pairwise iterated public goods games. We calculated ensemble mean fitness across 105
replicate populations, each evolved under weak mutation for at least 106 fixation events. We compared populations
with only two investment choices available, C1 = 0 and C2 = 1, versus populations in which players could choose
among 11 levels of investment, between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.1. In both cases evolution occurred on the full
set of memory-1 strategies. When the ratio of public benefit to individual cost is small, two-choice populations
evolve to low mean fitness and exhibit little cooperation, whereas 11-choice populations evolve higher fitness and
higher levels of investment in the public good. However, when the ratio of public benefit to individual cost is higher
two-choice populations evolve strategies that maximize the public good, whereas 11-choice populations are less
cooperative and receive roughly 10% payoff reduction compared to the two-choice case. Thus, a larger repertoire of
behavioral options can either facilitate or impede the evolution of cooperation, depending upon the public return
on individual investment.
We first consider the case of a completely symmetric game of rock-paper-scissors, with C1 = C2 =
C3 = C. In this case a given round of the game has only three distinct outcomes for a player: win (+),
lose (-) or draw (o). A player’s memory-1 strategy can be thought of as the probability that she plays,
for example, a move that would have won in the preceding round, given that she lost. We write this
probability p+−. Similarly p
−
− is the probability she plays the same move that lost the preceding round;
and po− is the probability that she plays the move that would have resulted in a draw. This symmetric
strategy is thus composed of 9 probabilities, which are written in our alternative coordinate system as:
poo = 1− (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p−− = 1− (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p++ = 1 + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
po+ = λ
o
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p−o = λ
−
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p+− = λ
+
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
po− = λ
o
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p−+ = λ
−
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p+o = λ
+
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
where we have set λoo = λ
+
+ = λ
−
− = 0 as a boundary condition. We see immediately from this that there
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exists no viable ZD strategy, for which λij = 0, ∀i, j, unless we also set κ = χ = φ = 0 to produce the
singular “repeat” strategy [2]. Nonetheless, we can still analyse the outcome of iterated rock-paper-scissors
games using this coordinate system.
Maintaining behavioral diversity in a game of rock-paper-scissors:
The symmetric, iterated rock-paper-scissors game is simple to analyse, because payoff is conserved, mean-
ing that the sum of two interacting players’ payoffs is constant, Sxy + Syx = B − 2C. Thus the expected
fitness of a population is independent of the strategy that is resident, and Sxx = B/2 − C holds for all
strategies X. It might seem unlikely, then, that behavioral diversity offers any advantage in this situation.
After all, a player who uses a strategy that employs only rock, paper or scissors produces no higher mean
fitness at the population level than a player who always uses rock. To determine whether this intuition
is correct, and non-transitive payoffs lead inevitably to a loss of behavioral diversity, we evaluated the
conditions for a strategy to resist selective invasion by a player who always uses the same move. Such
strategies do indeed exist, and satisfy the following inequality:
p−o (1− p−− − p−+) > p+o (1− p++ − p+−). (5)
As one might hope, strategies that tend to switch to the move that would have won in the preceding round
– corresponding to larger values of p+o , p
+
−, p
+
+ and smaller values of p
−
o , p
−
−, p
−
+ – tend to be evolutionary
robust. However Eq. 6 also provides a more valuable insight, if we calculate the overall robustness of
memory-1 strategies to the loss of behavioral diversity. To do this we calculate the probability that a
randomly drawn memory-1 strategy satisfies Eq. 6, which reveals that fully 50% of such strategies maintain
behavioral diversity in the completely symmetric rock-paper-scissors game (Figure 4). Furthermore, due
to symmetry, the condition for a new strategy to invade a resident is simply Syx > Sxy (see SI). And so
if a resident can resist invasion against a particular invader, it can also invade a population in which that
invader is resident. Thus 50% of strategies can successfully invade in a population that lacks behavioral
diversity – so that behavioral diversity is both highly evolvable and easy to maintain in the iterated
rock-paper-scissors game, even in a well-mixed population – in sharp contrast to the one-shot game.
We can also assess the robustness of behavioral diversity when the symmetry of the game is broken,
so that C1 6= C2 6= C3. In Figure 4a we numerically calculate the overall robustness of randomly drawn
strategies as a function of the costs C1/C3 and C2/C3 keeping B and C3 fixed. We find that, for a wide
range of costs, including in some cases with B < C, behavioral diversity can be maintained with relative
ease in an evolving population (Fig. 4).
Discussion
We have studied how the repertoire of behavioral options influences the prospects for cooperation, and
the maintenance of behavioral diversity, in evolving populations. Our analysis has relied on the theory of
iterated games and, in particular, on a coordinate system we developed to describe strategies for multi-
choice games and their effects on long-term payoffs. In the context of public goods games, we have shown
that simple strategies that use only two levels of investment can nonetheless stabilize cooperative behavior
against arbitrarily diverse mutant invaders, provided the simple strategy has sufficient opportunity to pun-
ish defectors. More generally, a greater diversity of investment options can either facilitate or hinder the
evolution of cooperation, depending on the ratio of public benefit produced to an individual’s investment
cost. We have applied the same analytical framework to study more complicated multi-choice iterated
games with non-transitive payoffs, such as the rock-paper-scissors game. In this case, behaviorally diverse
strategies that employ multiple actions are often evolutionary robust, even in a well-mixed population,
and they can likewise invade populations that lack diverse behaviors. Overall, the view emerges that
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Figure 4: Can behavioral diversity be maintained under non-transitive payoff structures? We considered a rock-
paper-scissors type game in which players could employ up to three different behaviors, at a cost C1, C2 and C3, in
an attempt to obtain a fixed benefit B. The payoff structure was non-transitive so that action 1 dominates action
2, action 2 dominates action 3, and action 3 dominates action 1. We determined whether a memory-1 strategy
that employs all three behaviors can resist invasion by a player who uses a single action exclusively (either 1, 2,
or 3). (a) With fixed benefit B = 2 and cost C3 = 1 we systematically varied costs C1 and C2, and we calculated
the percentage of memory-1 strategies that could successfully maintain behavioral diversity. Behavioral diversity
can indeed be maintained for a wide range of costs. The highest level of robust diverse strategies occurs in the
symmetric case, when C1 = C2 = C3. But diverse behaviors are across a broad range of parameters including,
surprisingly, when both C1 > B and C2 > B. This is seen more clearly in (b) which shows the percentage of robust
strategies as a function of C1 with C2 = C3.
simple behavioral interactions are sometimes surprisingly robust against diverse alternatives, and yet, in
many circumstances, diverse behavior serves the mutual benefit of a population and is a likely outcome
of evolution.
Our results on the impact of multiple behavioral choices should be compared to those of McAvoy &
Hauert [31], who studied ZD strategies in the two-player donation game, with an arbitrary action space.
Those authors established that ZD strategies exist even in this general setting. They focused especially
on extortion strategies, whereby one player unilaterally sets the ratio of scores against her opponent.
McAvoy & Hauert found, remarkably, that extortion strategies exists with support on only two actions,
even against an opponent who can choose from an uncountable number of actions. Our results form a
intriguing contrast to those of McAvoy & Hauert. Instead of studying ZD strategies and extortion in
the classical context of two players, we have studied all memory-1 strategies and the prospects for robust
cooperation in a population of N > 2 players. We find that behaviorally depauperate strategies that
rely on only two actions can nonetheless sustain cooperation in a population facing diverse invaders; and
yet diversity can either hinder or facilitate cooperation, depending upon the ratios of public benefit to
individual cost.
We have analyzed the entire space of memory-1 strategies for iterated multi-choice games. The purview
of our analysis can be put in context by comparison to the yet wider space of long-memory strategies, on
the one hand, and the smaller space of ZD strategies, on the other hand. As discussed here and elsewhere,
strategies that are evolutionary robust against the full space of memory-1 strategies are also robust against
all longer-memory strategies [2,33] (also see Supporting Information), making this a natural strategy space
to consider from an evolutionary perspective. Nonetheless, memory can have an important impact on the
relative success of different types of robust strategies, by making them more or less evolvable [3], or by
allowing qualitatively different types of decision-making via tagging or kin recognition [54]. Conversely,
it is important to consider the full space of memory-1 strategies in the context of multi-choice games
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because, as we have shown, such games may contain no ZD strategies at all, as in the case of iterated
rock-papers-scissors.
It is perhaps unsurprising that games with non-transitive payoffs do not in general admit the oppor-
tunity for one player to exert unilateral control over the game’s outcome via ZD strategies – after all,
a player cannot successfully extort an opponent whose behavior is so diverse that it cannot be pinned
down. Yet our analysis also offers a novel perspective on the problem of diversity maintenance in evolving
populations. One-shot rock-paper-scissors games have long been studied in the context of evolutionary
ecology as a system that cannot easily maintain diversity without spatial structure or other exogenous
population heterogeneity [44–50]. Here, by contrast, we have shown that behaviorally diverse strategies
in the iterated game can easily emerge and resist invasion by behaviorally depauperate mutants, an ob-
servation which is relevant to behavioral interactions within a single population and also to interactions
between species.
Overall we have seen that, as players gain access to more behavioral choices, either due to environ-
mental shifts or evolutionary innovation, the dynamics of social evolution can be profoundly altered. This
view is reflected by empirical studies, which have found that greater behavioral choice, via factors such
as the ability to communicate or signal to others, has a significant impact on the level of cooperation
in a group [8–14]. Moving forward, we must connect the insights drawn from complex behavioral and
evolutionary models of the type described here to empirical studies, where we can now seek quantitative
predictions for the dynamics of group behavior in real populations.
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Supporting Information
In this supplement we first generalize the results of Press & Dyson 2012 and Stewart & Plotkin 2014 [1,2]
to the case of an infinitely iterated, d-choice, two-player game. We then apply those results to study
evolutionary robustness of cooperation in a public goods game and maintenance of behavioral diversity
in a rock-paper-scissors game.
Infinitely Iterated Multi-choice Games
In this supplement, we generalize the results of [2] to a game with an arbitrary number d of pure strategies,
which we refer to as different “choices”. We start by repeating Press & Dyson’s argument for relating the
payoffs for each player to a determinant.
The essential fact for their argument is that 1 is a simple (left) eigenvalue for an n × n Markov
transition matrix M . Recall that , for square matrices, the left and right eigenvalues are the same and
have equal multiplicities (this is easily seen by observing that the characteristic equations for MT and
M are equal: det(λI −MT ) = det(λI −M)).
Now, 1 is always a left eigenvalue of any transition matrix - because the rows must sum to 1, the
vector 1 with all entries equal to 1 is a right eigenvector for the eigenvalue 1. The only constraint to
generalizing the result of [2] to more than two choices is that 1 must continue to be a simple eigenvalue
i.e. up-to-scalar multiples, the (left) eigenvector v such that vTM = vT must be unique (for the sake of
concreteness, we will normalize v so that all it’s entries sum to 1). This is a consequence of the Perron-
Frobenius Theorem, which says that if M is a non-negative (i.e. all entries are non-negative), irreducible
matrix, then the spectral radius of the matrix (here equal to 1) is a simple eigenvector. We recall a matrix
A is reducible if there exists a permutation matrix P such that PAP T is block upper triangular, and
is irreducible otherwise. A more revealing equivalent expression for irreducibility is that there exists k
such that (Ak)ij > 0 for all i, j, i.e. the Markov chain has a positive probability of getting from state i to
state j in finite time. A two-player game is not necessarily irreducible, e.g. the game in which player one
always plays the choice they played in the previous round, and the eigenvector v need not be unique (in
the aforementioned example, there are as many distinct eigenvectors as there are choices). Nonetheless,
reducible strategies are a lower dimensional subspace of all strategies, and are thus non-generic.
Now, suppose that v is the unique left eigenvector of M corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 and set
M ′ := M − I. Then v is the unique vector such that vTM ′ = 0, so 0 is an eigenvalue of M ′. Thus,
det(M ′) = 0, and Cramer’s rule tells us that
Adj(M ′)M ′ = det(M ′)I = 0,
from which we conclude that every row of Adj(M ′) is a left eigenvector for the eigenvalue 0, and thus
must be a scalar multiple of v.
Recall that, given an n × n matrix A, the classical adjoint of A, Adj(A) is the matrix with entries
equal to the cofactors of A:
Adj(A)ij = (−1)i+j det(A(i|j)),
where A(i|j) is the n− 1× n− 1 matrix obtained by deleting the ith row and jth column of A. We also
recall Laplace’s cofactor expansion for the determinant: for any choice of row i or column j, we have
det(A) =
n∑
j=1
(−1)i+j det(A(i|j))aij =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+j det(A(i|j))aij .
Now, in [2], the authors observe that if f is any column vector in Rn and (A|f) is the matrix obtained
by replacing the nth column of A with f , then
det((A|f)) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n det((A|f)(i|n))(A|f)in =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+n det(A(i|d))fi =
n∑
i=1
Adj(A)infi
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(n.b.A(i|n)) is obtained by deleting the nth column of (A|f), and thus is equal to A(i|n), whereas
(A|f)in = fi by construction), and that this latter is the dot product of the nth column of Adj(A) with
f . Now, as we have already observed, the nth column of Adj(M ′) is αv, for some non-zero α, so
det((M ′|f)) = αv · f
for arbitrary f . In particular, recalling that all entries of v sum to 1, we have
det((M ′|1)) = αv · 1 = α
and thus
det((M ′|f))
det((M ′|1)) = v · f . (6)
Next, recall that det(A) is an alternating multilinear function of the columns of A, so for arbitrary m,
vectors f1, · · · ,fm ∈ Rn, and scalars α1, . . . , αm
det
((
A
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
αkfk
))
=
m∑
k=1
αk det((A|fk)),
and thus,
det ((M ′|∑mk=1 αkfk))
det((M ′|1)) =
m∑
k=1
αk(v · fk).
Press & Dyson then observe that player i’s payoff is Si := v ·Ri, where Ri is the vector of payoffs received
by player i and v is the vector giving the equilibrium rate of different plays in an infinitely iterated game.
If there are 2 players, then
det ((M ′|α1R1 + α2R2 + α31))
det((M ′|1)) = α1S12 + α2S21 + α3.
Now, to get the enforced relation
α1S12 + α2S21 + α3 = 0,
Press & Dyson use the alternating property of the determinant, namely that if any two columns are equal
(or more generally, if there exists a subset of columns such that some linear combination of those columns
is equal to one of the remaining columns) then the determinant is 0.
Thus, to generalize the result of [2], we need only verify that each of the two players can independently
force the equality of at least two columns.
The first step in doing this to recalling that for any matrix A, det(A) is left unchanged by replacing
any row or column by itself plus a linear combination of the other rows or columns, respectively. Thus,
if by such operations, we can transform (M ′|f) to a matrix ˜(M ′|f) with one column that only depends
on player i’s strategy, say p, then player i can enforce the linear relation (and, since i is arbitrary, so can
any other player) by setting a column that they control equal to
α1R1 + α2R2 + α31.
In what follows, we show that in the case of d choices, which we label 0, . . . , d − 1, the transition
matrix M is such that for an arbitrary vector f ∈ Rn (here, n = d2) (M ′|f) has d columns that are
completely determined by player 1 and d columns that are controlled by player 2.
We order the possible outcomes of play by the d-ary ordering. That is to say, we denote the event
where player 1 plays choice j and player 2 strategy k by jk, and order these events such that jk is the
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(d− 1)j + kth possible outcome. Throughout this section, we will use d = 3 as an example to clarify the
discussion; in this case, we have possible plays
11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33
Let pijk and q
i
kj (i = 1, . . . , d, j, k = 1, . . . , d) denote the probabilities that player 1 and player 2
respectively use choice i given that in the previous round player 1 used choice j and player 2 used choice
k
k∑
j=1
k∑
k=1
pijk = 1 and
k∑
j=1
k∑
k=1
qijk = 1.
With this notation, the transition matrix M has entries
mi,jk = p
i
jkq
i
jk,
which, for d = 3 gives us
M =

p111q
1
11 p
1
11q
2
11 p
1
11(1− q111 − q211) · · ·
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 p
1
12(1− q121 − q221) · · ·
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231) · · ·
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · ·
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · ·

Next, M ′ has entry m′i,j = mi,j − δi,j , where δi,j is Kronecker’s delta function. Again, for d = 3, this
gives
M ′ =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111(1− q111 − q211) · · ·
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112(1− q121 − q221) · · ·
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231)− 1 · · ·
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · ·
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · ·

Finally, the row corresponding to the plays jk of (M ′|f) has entries
p1jkq
1
kj , . . . , p
1
jkq
d
kj , p
2
jkq
1
kj , . . . , p
j
jkq
k
kj − 1, . . . , pdjkq1kj , . . . , pdjkqd−1kj , fjk,
and continuing to illustrate this with d = 3, we have
(M ′|f) =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111(1− q111 − q211) · · · , f11
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112(1− q121 − q221) · · · , f12
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13(1− q131 − q231)− 1 · · · , f13
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21(1− q112 − q212) · · · , f21
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33(1− q133 − q233) · · · , f33

Thus, the sum of the first d entries of the jkth row of (M ′|f) is
p1jkq
1
kj + · · ·+ p1jkqdkj =
{
p1jk − 1 if j = 1
p1jk otherwise
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Similarly for the second d entries, and so on. Thus, if for each a = 0, . . . , d−1, we replace the adth column
by the sum of columns ad, ad + 1, . . . , ad + d − 1, a transformation that leaves det((M ′|f)) unchanged,
the resulting matrix has a adth column with jkth entry{
pa+1jk − 1 if j = a+ 1
pa+1jk otherwise
i.e. the adth column depends only on player 1, and player 1 controls d columns, one for each available
choice. Proceeding similarly, we see that player 2 also controls exactly d columns.
To see this concretely, for d = 3, if we replace the third column of (M ′|f) by the third column plus
the first and the second (which preserves the determinant), we get
(M ′|f) =

p111q
1
11 − 1 p111q211 p111 − 1 · · · , f11
p112q
1
21 p
1
12q
2
21 − 1 p112 − 1 · · · , f12
p113q
1
31 p
1
13q
2
31 p
1
13 − 1 · · · , f13
p121q
1
12 p
1
21q
2
12 p
1
21 · · · , f21
...
...
...
p133q
1
33 p
1
33q
2
33 p
1
33 · · · , f33

(7)
Thus, player 1 controls the third column of ˜(M ′|f) with their probabilities of playing choice 1. Similarly
replacing column 6 with the sum of columns 4, 5, and 6, we get a new column 6 with entries
p211, p
2
12, p
2
13, p
2
21 − 1, p222 − 1, p223 − 1, p231, p232, p233
to conclude that player 1 controls 2 columns.
Memory in multi-choice games
Appendix A of [2] tells us that if player 1 has memory m1 and player 2 has memory m2 > m1, then for
any strategy played by player 2, there is a memory m1 strategy that will yield the same expected payoff,
which should be qualified by clarifying that the expected payoff refers to expectation with respect to all
possible histories (as opposed to, say, expectation conditional on a given history of play). Let Hn denote
the history of plays up until the nth round, and let S1(n), S2(n) denote the strategy played by player 1
and 2 respectively in the nth round; then player i has memory mi is the statement that
E[Si(n) = s|Hn] = E [Si(n) = s|(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−mi), S2(n−mi))]
Now, let S˜2 be a random variable such that
P
(
S˜2(n) = s
∣∣∣(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−m1), S2(n−m1)))
= E [P (S2(n) = s|(S1(n− 1), S2(n− 1)), . . . , (S1(n−m2), S2(n−m2)))] ,
where the expectation is over the outcomes of the plays (S1(n−m1), S2(n−m1)), . . . , (S1(n−m2), S2(n−
m2)). Then S˜2 is a memory m1 strategy and it is shown in [2] that player 1 has the same payoff playing
against the new player S˜2 as against the original opponent playing S2. Since the Nash equilibrium depends
only on the expected payoff, this tells us that we may equally well determine the Nash equilibrium by
playing against the shorter memory player.
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Coordinate system for memory-1 strategies in multi-choice games
Just as in the case of two-choice games, we can use Eqs. 1 and 2 to construct a coordinate system for the
space of memory-1 strategies. Consider a d-choice, two-player game with strategy (p1,p2, . . .,pd) where
each pi is a vector of d2 probabilities, each corresponding to the probability that a player makes choice i in
the next round given the outcome of the preceding round. By definition we must have
∑k
i p
i
j = 1,∀j ∈ D
where D is the set of possible choices in the game. In order to construct an alternate coordinate system we
must choose d2 vectors that form a basis Rd2 . To do this we choose d(d+1)/2 vectors that have entry 1 at
the ith and jth position for all pairs i, j and entry zero otherwise. We also choose d(d− 1)/2 vectors that
have entry 1 at the ith and entry −1 at the jth for all paris i, j, where we adopt the convention that the first
entry is positive. The new coordinate system is the
{
Λ+11,Λ
+
12, . . .,Λ
+
1d, . . .,Λ
+
dd,Λ
−
1d, . . .,Λ
−
1d, . . .,Λ
−
d−1d
}
and we have in the case d = 3
det

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

= −8 (8)
which is a basis R9 as required. From Eqs. 1 and 2 we then end up with
d∑
i=1
Λ+iivii + d∑
j=i+1
Λ+ij(vij + vji) + Λ
−
ij(vij − vji)
 = 0 (9)
where vij is the equilibrium rate of the play ij, with the focal player’s move is listed first. Now let the
expected payoff to a focal player X and her opponent Y to be Sxy and Syx respectively. By definition
these satisfy:
Sxy + Syx =
d∑
i=1
2Riivii + d∑
j=i+1
(Rij +Rji)(vij + vji)
 (10)
and
Sxy − Syx =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=i
(Rij −Rji)(vij − vji) (11)
where Rij is the payoff to the focal player in a given round in which she played i and her opponent j.
Note also that
d∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
vij = 1 (12)
be definition. If we now set
Λ+ij =
φ− χ
2
(Rij +Rji)− (φ− χ)κ+ λ+ij (13)
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and
Λ+ij = −
φ+ χ
2
(Rij −Rji) + λ−ij (14)
and define
λij = λ
+
ij + λ
−
ij
and
λji = λ
+
ij − λ−ij
for all j > i, we can combine Eqs.4-9 to recover the following relationship:
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
λijvij = 0 (15)
Notice that we now have three extraneous parameters. In general a convenient choice is λ11 = λdd = 0
and λ1d = λd1, however more convenient choices can be made depending on the payoff structure of the
game being considered. Under this coordinate system, for a game with d = 3 we end up with
p111 = 1−
(
φ1R11 − χ1R11 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p112 = 1−
(
φ1R21 − χ1R12 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ12
)
p113 = 1−
(
φ1R31 − χ1R13 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ31
)
p121 = −
(
φ1R12 − χ1R21 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ21
)
p122 = −
(
φ1R22 − χ1R22 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ22
)
p123 = −
(
φ1R32 − χ1R23 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ23
)
p131 = −
(
φ1R13 − χ1R31 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ31
)
p132 = −
(
φ1R23 − χ1R32 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1 + λ32
)
p133 = −
(
φ1R33 − χ1R33 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
where we have used the superscript 1 to indicate that this is the probability of choosing to play 1. Clearly
the same argument holds for choices 2 and 3, with the caveat that
∑k
i p
i
j = 1, ∀j ∈ D.
We now use this coordinate system to analyse two multi-choice cases of particular interest: two-choice
strategies playing against multi-choice invaders in a public goods game, and multi-choice strategies playing
against single choice invaders in a rock-paper scissors game.
Robust strategies in multi-choice public goods games
We now turn our attention to a multi-choice public goods game, in which a pair of players who invest Cj
and Ck respectively in a given round of play generate a total benefit Bjk such that
Rjk = Bjk/2− Cj
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We are interested in whether a two-choice strategy can be evolutionary robust against an invader who
can vary his investment level in an arbitrary way. Thus we assume a focal strategy that can invest either
C1 or C2. We assume λ11 = λ22 = 0 and λ12 = λ21. When faced with an opponent who plays with d
investment levels, the two-choice player may in general have 2d probabilities for cooperation
p111 = 1− ((φ− χ)(B11/2− κ)− φC1 + χC1)
p112 = 1− ((φ− χ)(B12/2− κ)− φC2 + χC1 + λ12)
p113 = 1− ((φ− χ)(B13/2− κ)− φC3 + χC1 + λ13)
...
p11d = 1− ((φ− χ)(B1d/2− κ)− φCd + χC1 + λ1d)
p121 = − ((φ− χ)(B12/2− κ)− φC1 + χC2 + λ12)
p122 = − ((φ− χ)(B22/2− κ)− φC2 + χC2)
p123 = − ((φ− χ)(B23/2− κ)− φC3 + χC2 + λ23)
...
p12d = − ((φ− χ)(B2d/2− κ)− φCd + χC2 + λ2d)
where p2jk = 1− p1jk. The resulting relationship between players’ scores is given by
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) = 0 (16)
We can observe immediately that the first four terms of Eq. 11 corresponds to the type of two-choice
games that have been studied extensively elsewhere.
Looking at the sum and difference between players’ scores in this game we find
Sxy+Syx = (B11−2C1)v11+(B22−2C2)v22+(B12−C1−C2)(v12+v12)+
d∑
j=3
(B1j−C1−Cj)v1j+(B2j−C2−Cj)v2j
(17)
and
Sxy − Syx = (C2 − C1)(v12 − v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (18)
Now let us focus on a resident, two-choice strategy who can invest either C1 or C2 where C1 > C2, and
which stabalizes cooperation investment at C1 when resident in a population, i.e such that κ = B11/2−C1.
We have bounds on players scores of
Sxy + Syx ≤ (B11 − 2C1) + (B12 + C1 − C2 −B11)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B1j + C1 − Cj −B11)v1j + (B2j − C2 − Cj −B11 + 2C1)v2j (19)
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which becomes an equality when v22 = 0, and
Sxy + Syx ≥ (B22 − 2C2) + (B12 − C1 + C2 −B22)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B1j − C1 − Cj −B22 + 2C2)v1j + (B2j + C2 − Cj −B22)v2j (20)
which becomes an equality when v11 = 0, and
Sxy − Syx ≥ −(C1 − C2)(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (21)
which becomes an equality when an opponent never invests C2 and
Sxy − Syx ≤ (C1 − C2)(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j (22)
which becomes an equality when an opponent never invests C1.
In order for a rare mutant Y to invade a population with a resident X we must have
Syx >
N − 2
N − 1(B11/2− C1) +
1
N − 1Sxy (23)
Combining this with Eq. 11 we then get(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Sxy − (B11/2− C1)) > λ12(v12 + v21) +
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j) (24)
Combining this with Eq14. and Eq. 16 we then get two conditions for evolutionary robustness, firstly
N
N − 1
λ12(v12 + v21) + d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
 >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)[
(B12 + C1 − C2 −B11)(v12 + v12)
+
d∑
j=3
(B1j + C1 − Cj −B11)v1j + (B2j − C2 − Cj −B11 + 2C1)v2j
]
(25)
which means that we must have
N
N − 1λij > −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(B11 − 2C1 −Bij + Ci + Cj) (26)
We also get
22
N − 2
N − 1λ12(v12 + v21) +
N − 2
N − 1
d∑
j=3
(λ1jv1j + λ2jv2j)
> −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)(C1 − C2)(v12 + v21)− d∑
j=3
(Cj − C1)v1j + (Cj − C2)v2j
 (27)
which means we must have
N − 2
N − 1λij >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(Cj − Ci), ∀j > 2 (28)
This second equation is always hardest to satisfy when Cj is minimized. For the former condition, we
assume Bij = r(Ci + Cj)
α to get
N
N − 1λij >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(r(2C1)
α − 2C1 − r(Ci + Cj)α + (Ci + Cj))
which is hardest to satisfy when the right hand side is maximized. When this occurs depends in general
on the choice of α, but if α = 1 this condition is also hardest to satisfy when Cj = 0. Thus we have:
N
N − 1λ10 > −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
(r − 1)C1
N
N − 1λ20 > −
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
((r − 1)(2C1 − C2))
N − 2
N − 1λ10 >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
C1
N − 2
N − 1λ20 >
(
χ− φ 1
N − 1
)
C2
(29)
as our conditions for a two-choice strategy to be robust. We can also convert Eq. 20-23 back to the
original coordinate system to give the following robustness conditions
Cds =
{
(p11, p12, . . . , p1d, p21, p22, . . . , p2d)
∣∣∣∣p11 = 1,
p1j < 1− N − 2
N
(1− p12 + p21)1− c
∗
1− c
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
,
p2j <
N − 2
N
(1− p12 + p21)
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
1− c∗
1− c +
1
N − 2
]
,
p1j < 1− p22
r − 1
1− c∗
1− c
[
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
]
p2j <
p22
r − 1
[
r
2
−
(
N − 1
N − 2 −
r
2
)
1− c∗
1− c +
1
N − 2
]}
,
23
(30)
which is Eq. 3 of the main text. Finally in order for a strategy to be robust it must be viable, in addition
to satisfying Eq. 25, which leaves us with the condition
r − 1
r
2 +
1
N−2
>
C2
C1
(31)
which must be satisfied in order for a robust two-choice strategy to exist.
Games with non-transitive payoff structures
We now consider the rock-paper-scissors game, which is a three-choice, non-transitive game. We assume
a payoff structure R13 = B − C1, R21 = B − C2, R32 = B − C3, R31 = −C3, R12 = −C1 and R23 = −C2
which gives a non-transitive relationship between the choices 1=rock, 2=paper and 3=scissors. We assume
that when two players make the same choice they receive equal payoff: R11 = B/2−C1, R22 = B/2−C1
and R33 = B/2− C1. In the alternate coordinate system a strategy is written as
p111 = 1− (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C1 − κ1
)
p112 = 1−
(
φ1(B − C2) + χ1C1 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p113 = 1 +
(
φ1C3 + χ
1(B − C1) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p121 = λ
1
21 +
(
φ1C2 + χ
1(B − C1) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p122 = λ
1
22 − (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C2 − κ1
)
p123 = λ
1
23 −
(
φ1(B − C3) + χ1C2 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p131 = λ
1
31 −
(
φ1(B − C1) + χ1C3 − (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p132 = λ
1
32 +
(
φ1C2 + χ
1(B − C3) + (φ1 − χ1)κ1
)
p133 = λ
1
33 − (φ1 − χ1)
(
B/2− C3 − κ1
)
and
p211 = λ
2
11 − (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C1 − κ2
)
p212 = λ
2
12 −
(
φ2(B − C2) + χ2C1 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p213 = λ
2
13 +
(
φ2C3 + χ
2(B − C1) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p221 = 1 +
(
φ2C2 + χ
2(B − C1) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p222 = 1− (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C2 − κ2
)
p223 = 1−
(
φ2(B − C3) + χ2C2 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p231 = λ
2
31 −
(
φ2(B − C1) + χ2C3 − (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p232 = λ
2
32 +
(
φ2C2 + χ
2(B − C3) + (φ2 − χ2)κ2
)
p233 = λ
2
33 − (φ2 − χ2)
(
B/2− C3 − κ2
)
where we set λ = 0 for the case where a player uses the same move as she played in the preceding round.
If we consider the symmetrical case C1 = C2 = C3 we can set
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poo = 1− (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p−− = 1− (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p++ = 1 + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
po+ = λ
o
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p−o = λ
−
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
p+− = λ
+
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
po− = λ
o
− − (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ)
p−+ = λ
−
+ + (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
p+o = λ
+
o − (φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
where subscript indicates the outcome of the preceding round – win (+), lose (-) or draw (o) and the
superscript refers to the choice to switch to the move that would have resulted in that outcome in the
preceding round. Note also that by definition p+o + p
−
o + p
o
o = 1 etc so that the following must hold:
λ−o + λ
+
o = 3(φ− χ) (B/2− C − κ)
λo+ + λ
−
+ = −3 (φC + χ(B − C) + (φ− χ)κ)
λ+− + λ
o
− = 3 (φ(B − C) + χC − (φ− χ)κ) (32)
Against an opponent who only plays rock=1, the following relationships between players scores must hold
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λo+v21 + λo−v31 = 0
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ+o v11 + λ+−v31 = 0
φSyx − χSxy − (φ− χ)κ+ λ−o v11 + λ−+v21 = 0
(33)
with equivalent equalities for invaders who only play paper or scissors, which we can ignore due to the
assumed symmetry of the problem.
Finally, note that in the totally symmetrical game the sum of both players longterm average payoffs
is constant:
Sxy + Syx = B − 2C (34)
and in order for a mutant to successfully invade therefore requires
Syx >
N − 2
N − 1(B/2− C) +
1
N − 1Sxy
which in turn implies
B/2− C > Sxy
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Combining Eqs. 27-29 we can now solve for v and arrive at the following inequality as the condition for
a strategy to maintain behavioral diversity in the symmetrical rock-paper-scissors game:
p−o (1− p−− − p−+) > p+o (1− p++ − p+−) (35)
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